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[L. A. No. 2227H.

[n Bank.

Peb. 2.5, 1953.]

IRWIN HARRY IWTH, Petitioner, v. THE STATE BAR,
Respondent.
[1] Attorneys-Reinstatement-Evidence.-Evidence of past mis-

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

conduct of a disbarred attorney is admissible in a proceeding
for his reinstatement.
!d.-Reinstatement-Burden of Proof.-A disbarred attorney
seeking reinstatement has the burden of proving rehabilitation by evidence of his present qualifications.
Id.-Reinstatement-Evidence.-Proof of present honesty and
integrity of disbarred attorney, applying for reinstatement,
must be sufficient to overcome the court's former adverse
judgment of his character.
Id.-Reinstatement-Evidence.-In determining whether a disbarred attorney seeking reinstatement has met the burden of
proving rehabilitation, the evidence of present character must
be considered in the light of the moral shortcomings which
resulted in the imposition of discipline.
Id.-Reinstatement-Evidence.-In proceeding for reinstatement of a disbarred attorney, the question is not whether
any evidence was presented to controvert his showing of
present good character, but whether his proof of reform is
convincing and overwhelming.
Id.-Reinstatement-Evidence.-The rehabilitation required to
reinstate an attorney disbarred because of his conviction on
a grand theft charge is not shown by evidence which merely
tends to prove a present good reputation for honesty and
integrity in business dealings, where his own testimony indicates a more than careless attitude toward the rules of conduct of the profession, where in discussing his financial affairs he consistently failed or refused to differentiate between capital and income, where he stated that his statement
of earnings in the petition complies with a rule of The State
Bar requiring a report of monthly earning·s and other income,
despite the fact that he presented no such statement, and
where he had misinformed one of his witnesses concerning
the reason for his disbarment and had informed none of
them of preceding transactions for which he had been investigated or disciplined.

[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Attorneys at Law, § 48; Am.Jur., Attorneys
at Law, § 301.
McK. Dig. References: [1-7] Attorneys, § 184; [8] Attorneys,
§ 187.
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17] Id.-Reinstatement--Evidence.-Letters of recommendation
and favorable testimony of witnesses are entitled to considerable weight in a procePding for reinstatement of a disbarred
attorney, but such evidence, however laudatory or great in
quantity, is not alone conclusive.
[8] !d.-Reinstatement--Review of Board's Action.-Although the
Supreme Court has plenary power to reinstate a disbarred
attorney, it will accord the greatest deference to the recommendation of The State Bar and its administrative committee, and only where the record clearly demonstrates that the
applicant possesses an acceptable appreciation of the duties
and responsibilities of an attorney at law in relation to his
clients and the courts, may a decision overruling the unfavorable action of the Board of Governors be justified.

APPLICATION for reinstatement of disbarred attorney.
Application denied.
John W. Preston for Petitioner.
Neil G. Locke and Jerold E. Weil for Respondent.
'fHE COURT.-Irwin Harry Roth was disbarred in 1942
upon conviction of a felony. (Bar Misc. No. 1745.) In 1950,
he petitioned for reinstatement. An administrative committee
of The State Bar unanimously recommended that his petition
for reinstatement be denied. The matter is before this court
upon Roth's petition to review the order of the Board of
Governors upholding that determination. (Rules on Original
Proceedings in Reviewing Courts, rule 59 [b].)
Roth first was admitted to practice in Missouri. In 1931,
following three years of practice in Missouri, he was admitted
to the California bar without examination.
About three years later, Roth was adjudged in contempt
of court for alleged volations of court orders restricting the
withdrawal and use of funds recovered as damages by minors
in personal injury actions in which they had been represented
by him. Because of the insufficiency of the affidavits by which
the contempt proceedings were instituted, he was released upon
a writ of habeas corpus. (In re Roth, 3 Cal.App.2d 226 [39
P.2d 490] .) In a concurring opinion, one justice suggested
that "the facts show a scandalous manipulation of funds
awarded by the court for the benefit of minors. Whether or
not petitioner was involved in such manipulation, I do not
intimate. It would seem, however, that the facts would admit
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of positive allegations should The State Bar be advised to
take further action." ( P. 237.)
Acting upon this suggestion, The State Bar instituted
disciplinary proceedings against Roth, charging him with
violation of court orders and misappropriation of funds of
elients. (L. A. No. 798.) Upon the recommendation of its
administrative committee, the Board of Governors dismissed
the proceeding for insufficiency of the evidence to support
the charges.
·
In 1937, Roth was suspended from practice for a period of
six months by order of this court for violations of the J{nles
of Professional Conduct by the solicitation of employment.
(Roth v. State Bar, 8 Cal.2d 656 [67 P.2d 337].) In that proceeding, only two specific cases were under investigation.
However, the court said: "The further fact should be mentioned that petitioner's conduct in other cases has been the
subject of investigation and that he has been employed in
other cases under suspicious circumstances.
'' \Ve entertain no doubt that petitioner has been soliciting
the employment of himself through persons wlro are not entitled to practice law and has been paying those persons for
this solicitation, and, from all the circumstances, we are convinced that his conduct has extended over a considerable
period of time . . . . " (P. 659.)
When Roth was retained in 1941 to defend Thayne Staker,
$1,000 was deposited with him to be used as bail. Roth put
up $500 as security for bail and retained the balance. As a
result of this transaction, Roth was charged with grand theft
and found guilty. He repaid the $1,000, sentence was suspende'd and he was placed on probation for 10 years.
'While this proceeding was pending, the Board of Governors
declined to accept Roth's proffered resignation without prejudice. Roth did not appeal from the judgment of conviction
;uHl he was disbarred automatically. (Bus. & Prof. Code,
§ 6102.) Five years later, probation was terminated, the .iudgJnt>nt set aside, and the cause dismissed under the provisions
of section 1203.4 of the Penal Code.
After disbarment, Roth volunteered for military service
but was rejected because of his age. He became a defense
worker in a shipyard, studied accounting at night school,
and secured a position in the accounting department of an
aircraft company.
Soon afterward, he went into the liquor business for himself. He sold that business about seven months later to pur-
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chase the first of a series of three bars which he operated
during the remainder of his period of probation. Two of
these bars were on South Main Street in the ''skid row''
section of l.JOS Angeles. The third was a de luxe restaurantnight club known as the "Californian" of which he was part
owner and operator from 1946 to 1949. For a short time, Roth
also engaged in an unprofitable building venture. After he
sold his interest in the "Californian," Roth sought employment in the aircraft industry but, because of his age, was
unable to find work.
In connection with his various liquor businesses, Roth obtained the requisite licenses after the usual investigation of
his character and reputation. No license was revoked, nor
was Roth at any time in difficulty with the authorities concerning the manner in which he conducted his premises. His
purchases of the various businesses were financed by substantial loans, one in excess of $70,000. Although, to a certain extent secured by the assets of the business including
the fixtures, it appears that the larger portion of these loans
was based upon personal credit. All such loans were repaid
in full, and Roth is not presently in debt.
In his petition for reinstatement, Roth stated his earnings
in lump sum figures ranging from about $1,300 in 1943 to
$5,200 in 1949, with a loss of approximately $1,600 in 1946.
No breakdown indicating the sources of his earnings was
given. He also presented copies of his federal income tax retnrns for the years 1947 to 1949. These show a declared income
of $2,100 in 1948 and $4,475 in 1949, rather than the $5,200
reported for each of those years in his petition for reinstatement. At the hearing before the administrative committee,
Roth testified that he ''earned over $1,000.00 a month'' in
1946. but that he had to sell one of his bars at a $13,000 loss.
He also stated that, in 1944, he had lost about $7,000 in stock
transactions. Apparently he deducted this Joss in arriving at a
"net income" figure for that year of approximately $1,800.
At the hearings before the local administrative committee,
Roth produced 11 witnesses who testified that his moral character and legal ability are good. He also presented eight
letters in which the writers expressed confidencein him. The
uncontradicted evidence shows that, since his disbarment. Roth
has not been in any leg·al difficulties and has been fair and
honest in his dealings with others.
'rwo officers of the vice squad of the Los Angeles Police

Department testified that Roth made every effort to conduct
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his bar business in a lawful manner. According to them, his
places were considered above average for the neighborhood in
which they were located. This opinion of Roth's business dealings was repeated by the probation officer who recommended
termination of his probation.
Five of the witnesses knew Roth only casually and based
their opinions of him either upon what he had told them
himself or upon information supplied by others. None of
them had beeu told of Hoth 's diseipline prior to his disbarment. lloth had misinformed one of them coneerning the
facts of his conviction. 'rhis witness said that Hoth 's inaccuracy in stating the reason for his disbarment "is inclined
to lessen my faith in him slightly.'' Although he had heard
nothing against Hoth, the witness said, ''vVhether he is reformefl eompletely or not, I do not know." Two of the others
stated that if they had kno1vn of Roth's prior difficultic•s their
opinion of him might have been different.
One witness, the judge who granted Roth probation after
his conviction, knew nothing concerning him since that time.
He stated that Roth had showed above average ability as
a practitioner before his court prior to his disbarment. Two
more of the witnesses who testified that Roth was capable
as an attorney based their opinion upon the ability which
he demonstrated in practice before being disbarred. Three
stated that he displayed a present understanding of legal
problems.
Only two of the witnesses had more than a casual acquaintance with Roth. One was his brother, the other a former
law associate. Basing their opinions upon the manner in
which Roth conducted his business operations, both felt that
he had rehabilitated himself. Recently, Roth has used his
former associate's law library for study.
Seven of the letters introduced into evidence were to the
effect that Roth has a reputation for honesty and integrity in
his business dealings. The eighth was written by the judge
who terminated his probation. Until the motion for dismissal came before him, he knew nothing of Roth's difficulties. In prior professional dealings with Roth, the judge
had been impressed with him "as being an honorable man."
The judge wrote, "I have every reason to believe that Mr.
Roth is worthy of the confidence of the community and
that it would be a credit to the Bar to reinstate him."
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No evidence was introduced to indicate that Roth has been
guilty of any wrongdoing since disbarment. The chief investigator for The State Bar testified that no complaints have
been made against Roth since his conviction.
Concerning one of the matters involved in the contempt
proceeding and the first disciplinary investigation (In re
Roth, supra; L. A. No. 798, supra), Roth testified that the
court directed money recovered for a minor to be placed
in the bank and not withdrawn until the boy reached his
majority. However, he said, "about six months later or so
the boy wanted to buy an automobile, and the parents wanted
him to have it and after that they withdrew sufficient money
to buy the car. That, in my opinion, was not a violation
of the court order."
He discussed the matters which led to his suspension (Roth
v. State Bar, supra) as follows: "When I came out here,
there were open and legal ambulance chasing businesses going
on . . . I would pay them a fiat fee for this investigation
work . . . it was a better deal than some lawyers that were
splitting a fee with them . . . I had only been out here for
a few years. And then I learned that the Bar Association
prohibited the handling of any case that was originally solicited regardless of what agreement the lawyer may have had
with the person who solicited it, and I quit handling any
cases that were originally solicited at least two years before
I was called into the Bar for handling and soliciting cases.''
Roth stated to the committee that he had no right to take
the money in the case which resulted in his conviction and
disbarment. He said that he needed it because of illness in
the family and thought he would be able to repay it from
the fee which he expected to receive upon completion of the
trial. The fee was not paid to him and he could not return
the money when it was demanded of him.
In regard to his present legal ability, Roth testified: "I
read all of the advance sheets decisions, I have read the codes,
I have read all the textbooks and pamphlets that he (Burby)
has for law students who are about to take the Bar examination, and I have discussed legal cases and legal problems
with lawyers that I know who keep abreast of it.'' He also
stated that he has attended refresher courses on procedure
and law lectures, as well as meetings of The State Bar.
The local administrative committee concluded that this
evidence was not sufficient to support the burden of proving
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rehabilitation and present learning in the law and that Roth
lacks the present qualifications for reinstatement. Its unanimous recommendation that the petition be denied was approved by the Board of Governors.
Roth contends that evidence of his past misconduct is irrelevant and does not constitute a ground for denying reinstatement. According to him, the relevant evidence shows
without dispute that he has both the moral and mental qualifications to practice law. The State Bar argues that Roth 'R
prior misconduct was properly considered. The position of
the Board of Governors is that he failed to meet the burden
of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that he is entitled to reinstatement.
[1] There is no merit to Roth's contention that evidence
of his past misconduct is inadmissible in this proceeding.
'rhe cases upon which he relies for this argument are those
which lay down the rule that the petitioner for reinstatement
may not attack the proceedings which resulted in his disbarment. (Maggart v. State Bar, 29 Cal.2d 439, 443 [175
P.2d 505]; In re Andreani, 14 Cal.2d 736, 751 r97 P.2d 456];
Vaughan v. State Bar, 208 Cal. 740, 742 [284 P. 909].)
[2] He has the burden of proving rehabilitation by evidence
of his present qualifications. (Maggart v. State Bar, supra.)
[3] This court repeatedly has held that "the person seeking reinstatement, after disbarment, should be required to
present stronger proof of his present honesty and integrity
than one seeking admission for the first time whose character
has never been in question. In other words, in an application for reinstatement, although treated by the. court as a
proceeding for admission, the proof presented must be sufficient to overcome the court's former adverse judgment of
applicant's character." (Kepler v. State Bar, 216 Cal. 52,
!iii f 13 P.2d 500 l ; P'rinste1'n v. State Bar, 30 <::al.2d 541,
!i46 [248 P.2d 3] ; Beeks v. State Ba1·, 35 Cal.2d 268, 27S
[217 P.2d 409]; Maggart v. State Bar, supra, p. 444; MeArtlmr v. State Bar, 28 Cal.2d 779, 788 [172 P.2d 55].) [ 4] In
determining whether that burden has been met, the evidence
of present character must be considered in the light of the
moral shortcomings which resulted in the imposition of dis<'ipline. (Feinstein v. State Bar, S1tpra, pp. 560-561 and
(•ases there cited.)
[5] Roth argues that hE' is entitled to reinstatement because the evidence which he produced of his present good
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moral character was undisputed. However, the question is
not whether any evidence was presented to controvert his
showing of present good character, but rather whether his
proof is ''clear and convincing, nay, . . . overwhelming,
proof of reform." (In Te MorgansteTn, 85 Cal.App. 113, 117
[259 P. 90] ; Feinstein v. State BaT, sttpm, p. 561; W ettlin
v. State Bar, 24 Cal.2d 862, 869 [151 P.2d 255] .)
[6] The very most which can be said for the evidence
produced by Roth is that it tends to prove a present good
reputation for honesty and integrity in business dealings.
There is no convincing or overwhelming proof that he now
possesses the highest moral qualities required of an attorney.
To the contrary, his own testimony indicates a more than
careless attitude toward the rules of conduct of the profession.
In discussing his financial affairs, Roth consistently failed
or refused to differentiate between capital and income. In
view of the fact that he testified to his qualification as an
accountant, it cannot be inferred that his confusion of finances
resulted from ignorance. He stated that his statement of
earnings in the petition complies with a rule of The State
Bar requiring a report of monthly earnings and other income, together with the sources thereof. This was despite
the fact that he had presented no statement of monthly
earnings and other income and had reduced his report of
annual income by capital losses. The failure to report a
monthly income in excess of $1,000, earned within five years
after his conviction for taking $500 of trust funds for his
own use, does not tend to prove that Roth possesses the
highest integrity.
The same indifferent attitude toward strict compliance
with the law is indicated in Roth's discussion of the contempt
proceeding. (In re Roth, supm; h A. No. 798, supm.) In
that instance, he did not consider the withdrawal of money
to purchase an automobile to be a violation of a conrt order
requiring the fund to be held intact. In like manner, Roth 'R
testimony indicates that he feels aggrieved by the action of
The State Bar in prosecuting him for ''ambulance chasing''
when it was being done openly. That he should have been
familiar with the professional rules of ethics does not seem
to have occurred to him.
The testimony of the witnesses whom Roth produced is
far from the clear and convincing ''proof which we could
with confidence lay before the world in justification of a
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jndgment agaiu installing him in the profession." (In n;
JVIorganstm·n. supra.) Mo,;t of them were mel'e c~asual acquaintances. One, in faet, knew nothing about his present
character. l~oth had misinformed one of the witnesses concerning the reason for his disbarment and had informed none
of them of the preceding series of transactions for which he
had been investigated or disciplined. Several of the witnesses indicated that such knowledge might have altered tJ1eir
opinion of him.
Roth relies upon J onesi v. State Bar, 29 Cal.2d 181 l178
P.2d 793], as being similar in facts to the present situation
and controlling upon the question of whether he should be
readmitted. However, in the J onesi case the local administrative committee unanimously recommended the petitioner's
readmission and the recommendation was approved by a
representative of the local bar association. The Board of
Governors, by a vote of nine to three, found that ,Jonesi was
not entitled to reinstatement. It appeared from the record,
however, that at least three of the members of the board were
influenced by a belief that J onesi was precluded from reinstatement because he had resigned in accordance with an order
terminating his right to apply for readmission. In addition,
J onesi produced recommendations by ''members of the bar
who had frequent and fairly intimate contact with him."
Under those circumstances, the court held that he was entitled to reinstatement.
[7] J_,etters of recommendation and the favorable testimony of witnesses are entitled to considerable weight, but
such evidence, however laudatory or great in quantity, is not
alone conclusive. (Feinstein v. State Bar, supra, p. 561.)
The committee of 'l'he State Bar, which has an opportunity
to hear the witnesses and the petitioner, is in a better position than is this court, which has only the printed record
upon which to determine the issue of the applicant's rehabilitation. [8] Although this court has plenary power to reinstate· an applicant, it has always accorded the greatest deference to the recommendation of The State Bar and its administrative committee. (In re Lacey, 11 Cal.2d 699, 701 [81
P .2d 935].) "Only where the record clearly and convincingly
demonstrates that the applicant possesses an acceptable appreciation of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney at
law in relation to his clients and the courts may a decision
overruling the unfavorable action of the Board of Governors
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lw justified." (Pm:nstm:n v. 8tnte Bnr, supra, p. S62; Beeks
\·. 8tatc Bar, supra., p. 277.)
1'he applieation of petitioner for reinstatement is denied.

CARTEH, J.-I dissent.
''The uncontradicted evidence shows that, since his disbarnu:'nt, Roth has not been in any legal difficulties and has been
fair and honest in his dealings with others." "No evidence
was iutroduced to indicate that Roth has been guilty of any
wrongdoing since disbarment. The chief investigator for The
State Bar testified that no complaints have been made against
noth since his conviction.'' These statements from the majority
opinion show that only evidence of misconduct prior to disbarment bars petitioner's right to reinstatement.
The above quoted statements also show that a majority of
this court has again considered conduct prior to disbarment
in determining ·whether petitioner is presently rehabilitated so
as to gain readmission to the Bar. It is also said that the evidence he must produce as to his present good moral character
must be ''clear and convincing, nay, . . . overwhelming, proof
of reform.'' I am still at a loss (see my dissent in Feinstein
v. State Bar, 39 Cal.2d 541, 548 [248 P.2d 3]) to know just
what is expected of a petitioner in a case such as this in way
of the proof he must adduce. If he produced all the people
with whom he has done business, or all the acquaintances he
has made since his disbarment, the majority would say that
none of them had known him before-or that because he had
done well in one type of business and gained a reputation for
good character and fair and honest business dealings there, he
might not have that same reputation in another type of business. It appears to me that no matter what he does, or says,
or how many witnesses he produces, The State Bar, aided
·md abetted by a majority of this Court, will deny him readmission to his chosen profession. If past conduct is to be considered in determining his present fitness to practice law,
then that is the only result which can be reached because, to
my mind, ''overwhelming,' proof would be proof with no
contradictions. If conduct prior to disbarment is not the determinative factor here, then the statements in the majority
opinion to the effect that no evidence was produced contrary
to the evidence of his good reputation show that petitioner has
borne the burden of proof and should be reinstated.
I would grant the application for reinstatement.

